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INSOLVENCY INSURANCE FOR PRIVATE
PLANS
MATTHEW M. LIND*
After five years of experience in administering Title IV of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),1 the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is presently considering propos-
als for substantial modification of the original structure of the plan ter-
mination insurance program that ERISA instituted in 1974. This
reevaluation of some of the assumptions underlying the original provi-
sions of Title IV suggests that the basic benefit guaranty program and
its accompanying imposition of liability upon employers who terminate
underfunded plans may be in need of alteration.2 ERISA was designed
to strengthen the integrity and financial responsibility of private retire-
ment plans. To that end, Titles I and II of the Act contain salutary
requirements with respect to participation, vesting, funding, disclosure,
fiduciary accountability and other aspects of the operation of ongoing
private pension plans However, Congress recognized that despite the
provisions of Titles I and II, some defined benefit pension plans4 would
terminate without sufficient assets to pay promised benefits in full. To
protect employees from complete or substantial loss of benefits in such
* Matthew M. Lind was formerly Executive Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration. This Article was prepared in collaboration with Lawrence M. Franklin, former Pol-
icy Analysis Officer, Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Executive Director, and Joseph J.
Bryer, Assistant General Counsel in the Office of General Counsel of the PBGC.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 18, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited by session law sections of ER-
ISA];
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, CONTINGENT EMPLOYER LIAnLITY INSUR-
ANCE: STATUS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1978) [hereinafter cited as CELI REPORT].
1. ERISA §§ 4001-4082.
2. See CELI REPORT. This Article is concerned with the termination insurance program
covering single employer defined benefit plans. These plans account for about 75% of approxi-
mately 30 million employees who are covered by defined benefit plans. [1977] PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORP. ANN. REP. 21. Recommendations regarding multiemployer plans are presently
pending before Congress.
3. ERISA §§ 1001-1034.
4. A defined benefit plan promises a participant a fixed, measurable benefit, usually related
to earning levels over a specified period of time and to length of service. A defined benefit is not
affected by the amount of contributions made to the plan by the employer. See Connolly v.
PBGC, 581 F.2d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1278 (1979).
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event, the PBGC was created under Title IV to guarantee certain basic
benefits within limits defined by the Act.5
To provide payment of such basic benefits6 when an underfunded
pension plan is terminated, the PBGC acts as an insurer of the plan.7
The premiums for this insurance are paid by all private defined pension
plans.8 When the PBGC becomes trustee of the plan for termination
purposes, it acquires the assets of the plan9 and can collect from the
employer the amount necessary to make up any deficiencies in the
plan's assets.' 0
Employer liability was included in the Act not only to provide the
PBGC with an additional means of financing the insurance program
but also, and perhaps more importantly, to deter solvent employers
from abusing the system by making unrealistic pension promises and
unnecessarily discontinuing plans, thus saddling the basic insurance
program with all or a portion of their unfulfilled obligations." Conse-
quently, section 4062 imposes liability upon an employer who termi-
nates an insufficient plan for the amount of the plan's asset
insufficiency, but limits such liability to thirty percent of the employer's
net worth.12
To alleviate further the possible adverse impact of liability upon
the employer's business operations and credit, the PBGC was granted
5. ERISA § 4022. The major purposes of the PBGC are
(i) to provide participants and beneficiaries in a defined benefit plan with certain mini-
mal guarantees as to the receipt of benefits under the plan, and (ii) to provide a mecha-
nism for administering and distributing to participants and beneficiaries of a defined
benefit plan the benefits to which they are entitled in case the plan is unable, or appar-
ently unable, upon termination to pay such benefits.
M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 19.1, at 459 (1977).
6. A basic benefit is essentially one payable monthly as a straight life annuity. The benefits
generally commence when the participant reaches age 65 and are based upon the employee's
earnings and length of service. See 29 C.F.R. § 2605.4 (1978).
7. The basic benefit insurance program insures the participants of the plan against loss of
benefits, but does not provide the employer with insurance against contingent liability that may
stem from plan termination. See M. CANAN, supra note 5, § 19.1, at 461. See generally id. § 19.6.
8. Initially, the rate of the premium was one dollar per participant for single employer plans
and 50 cents per participant in multiemployer plans. ERISA § 4006(a)(3). The premium for sin-
gle employer plans was changed to $2.60 per participant, effective for plan years beginning on or
after January 1, 1978. Act of December 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-214,91 Stat. 1502, to be codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1381.
9. ERISA § 4042(d)(l)(A)(ii).
10. Id § 4062. Other than funds generated through investment of plan assets, see Id
§ 4042(d)(l)(A)(iii), the premiums (and income thereon), plan assets and employer liability are the
only sources of revenue for the PBGC. The United States is not liable for any of the PBGC's
obligations. Id. § 4002(g)(2).
11. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1973), reprinted in 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 1157 (1976).
12. ERISA § 4062(b)(2).
[Vol. 1979:593
INSOL VENCY INSURA4NCE
discretionary authority to enter into arrangements for deferred pay-
ment terms.1 3 Pursuant to section 4023 of the Act, it was also contem-
plated that a program of contingent employer liability insurance
(CELl) would be developed by the PBGC to insure employers against
liability. The PBGC had authority to make CELI either mandatory or
voluntary.
14
In summary, although ERISA does not restrict an employer's right
to terminate its plan, once an employer has terminated its plan several
provisions of ERISA would come into play. First, if the guaranteed
benefits could not be provided from the plan's assets, the PBGC, as
trustee, would provide, through the plan termination insurance pro-
gram, the plan's participants with the basic benefits guaranteed under
ERISA. Second, in such event, the employer would be liable to the
PBGC for the insufficiency up to a maximum of thirty percent of the
employer's net worth upon termination. Third, to protect employers
from the contingent liability imposed upon termination, the PBGC
could set up a CELI program.
This Article appraises the current method of handling plan termi-
nation under ERISA and suggests that a more realistic approach to
plan termination might involve elimination of the immediate imposi-
tion of liability in the case of ongoing employers, limitation of plan
termination insurance to insolvency situations and elimination of
CELL Transforming the present structure of unrestricted plan termi-
nation into an insolvency insurance program could serve to strengthen
the maintenance and the integrity of the private pension system at an
acceptable premium cost that might be lower than the foreseeable cost
under Title IV of ERISA. Examining this prospect is pertinent when
the necessity and the desirability of the private pension sytem, as op-
posed to a government-administered retirement program, is being
questioned. 15
I. PLAN TERMINATION INSURANCE, EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND
CELI
On July 1, 1978, after more than three years of study and effort to
develop a workable CELI program, the staff of the PBGC reported its
conclusion to Congress that CELI, as contemplated by section 4023 of
13. Id. § 4067; S. REP. No. 383, supra note 11, at 88-89, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 11, at 1156-57.
14. ERISA § 4023(b).
15. Caifano Raises Doubts on Private Pensions, Pensions & Investments, Apr. 24, 1978, at 1,
col. 1.
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ERISA, was neither feasible nor desirable.' 6 This determination was
motivated primarily by a conceptual and pragmatic conviction that an
insurance program insulating ongoing and solvent employers from all
or substantially all liability for plan termination would, in effect, elimi-
nate employer liability from the Act. Such a result would upset the
original structural balance between employee protection and abuse of
the system that guaranty of employee benefits and accompanying em-
ployer liability were designed to accomplish.' 7 A CELI program could
well encourage unnecessary terminations by otherwise financially
sound employers and thus shift the cost of the unfunded liabilities of
their plans to the other premium payers of the system who are required
to support the termination insurance program.' 8
The CELI analysis has also led to a reconsideration of the time
when termination insurance should become available and of the pres-
ent statutory structure of employer liability.' The PBGC staff's major
concern with the present design of the termination insurance program
was the unilateral ease with which an ongoing employer could abandon
its commitment to its pension obligations when its business condition
did not necessarily require or warrant complete plan termination. Be-
cause ERISA places no limitations upon an employer's decision to ter-
minate a plan (other than potential liability for unfunded obligations)
and because termination insurance is available to employees without
any prior condition, financial convenience, rather than financial diffi-
culty, can be the reason for termination. The thirty percent of net
worth limitation2" on employer liability enables ongoing and otherwise
financially sound employers with sizeably underfunded plans to relieve
themselves of their administrative and financial burdens at a maximum
cost of thirty percent of their net worth.2 ' In many cases, recovery of
employer liability by the PBGC has accounted for only a relatively
small portion of the guaranteed benefits that the PBGC is required to
16. CELI REPORT 2, 5.
17. "Employer liability was imposed by Congress primarily to deter unrealistic pension
promises, to discourage unnecessary terminations and to protect against possible abuse of the
basic program. CELI would eliminate such liability and remove an essential cost control from the
termination insurance program." CELI REPORT 3.
18. Id. 4.
19. Id. 5-6.
20. In effect, equity owners of terminating employers are already insured to the extent of 70%
of their net worth. CELI would merely have increased such coverage to a higher percentage.
21. Thirty percent of the net worth of a corporation could amount to a substantial liability.
This limitation on potential liability for nonpayment of a debt has few parallels in law. For
instance, a corporate maker of a promissory note lacks the comforting knowledge that should it
fail to pay the note upon tender, its obligation is limited to 30% of its net worth. In effect, for
employers, § 4062(b)(2) gives the equity owners of a business double-limited liability: first, lim-
ited to the extent of their equity investment; and second, limited to only 30% of such investment.
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pay employees of the terminated plan.22 The deficit necessarily must
be absorbed by the community of premium payers under the basic pro-
gram.
This possibility could indicate that the present program might not
be fulfilling the first of the three statutorily stated purposes of Title
IV--"to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary pri-
vate pension plans for the benefit of their participants .... ,12 If em-
ployers can, with relative impunity, abandon their plans and shift the
major burden of their pension promises to the termination insurance
program at a time that would be financially advantageous to them, the
present provisions of ERISA could well encourage termination rather
than continuance of such plans.
A recent survey has compared unfunded pension liabilities to the
net worth and to the operating income of more than 1,500 major corpo-
rations.24 Several of the firms in the survey listed unfunded vested lia-
bilities of between twenty-five percent and thirty-five percent of their
net worth. For some, the unfunded pension liabilities exceeded fifty
percent of net worth.2 ' These numbers could, of course, change with a
fair market value standard for the measurement of net worth, but it is
reasonable to assume that the presentation of stockholders equity at
book value is as likely to overstate a company's fair market value as it
is to understate it.26 No matter how net worth is measured, however,
there is good reason to believe that many companies sponsoring pen-
sion plans have unfunded liabilities that account for a large percentage
of employer net worth. Nonetheless, in most instances the sponsors are
fully capable of discharging the liabilities. For example, the unfunded
vested benefits of 100 major companies in another recent survey to-
talled $18.5 billion, approximately 7.2% of the net worth of the 100
corporations.2 7
22. PBGC ANN. REP., supra note 2, at 27.
23. ERISA § 4002(a).
24. See INVESTORS MANAGEMENT SCIENCES, INC., UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITIES 1977
(1977). Net worth was measured on a book value basis. Id. iv.
25. Id.
26. For example, many companies in the natural resources industries (e.g., paper and min-
ing) may carry real estate assets at historical cost rather than market value. In many cases this
undervalues a company's assets. Such a conclusion could also be drawn with respect to service
industries and other labor intensive businesses that operate without the need for large amounts of
capital but that have a higher margin of profit. On the other hand, manufacturing firms in special-
ized industries, or ones with outdated plant and equipment, may, in many instances, find the
company's fair market value less than listed stockholder equity.
27. Unfunded Pension Liabilities: A Continuing Burden, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 14, 1978, at 60-61.
Only three of the 100 companies had unfunded vested benefits in excess of 50% of their corporate
net worth. Id.
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Many members of the pension community, including members of
the CELI Panel, think that it is inappropriate to relieve an ongoing
employer of its pension obligation through the use of net worth limita-
tions when the sponsor is financially capable of meeting that obligation
over a reasonable period of time. Thus, one may question whether the
current thirty percent net worth limitation on employer liability should
be applicable in all circumstances and whether the net worth limitation
operates effectively as a cost control device for the termination insur-
ance program.
Second, the necessity of making the net worth calculation has
proven to be very burdensome and expensive. Net worth is an ex-
tremely difficult valuation to make in practice. The statute calls for a
definition of net worth that "best reflects. . . the current status of the
employer's operations and prospects at the time .... ,28 As a result,
net worth is not viewed as an accounting concept, but as the fair market
value of the business. In situations where net worth might become a
limiting factor for employer liability, disputes inevitably arise as to the
appropriate methodology to be applied in measuring net worth and the
exact amount of the valuation.
Third, the PBGC presently may lack sufficient flexibility to re-
spond to the financial problems faced by employers following plan ter-
mination. Although many situations involving financial hardship can
be solved through the use of deferred settlement, not all can be, espe-
cially in cases of employers on the edge of bankruptcy.29 Furthermore,
even in the case of deferred payment terms, 0 it was not presumed that
they would be universally available to all employers, but rather that the
PBGC would exercise some degree of selectivity in granting such
terms.3'
The present sections of Title IV that provide relief from employer
liability thus may in some instances provide too much relief (thirty per-
cent of net worth limitations)32 and in other instances too little relief
(repayment terms).33 There is good reason to question whether simply
28. ERISA § 4062(c)(1).
29. Where temporary cash flow problems exist, deferred terms ordinarily would be appropri-
ate. Where business failure appears imminent, deferred terms would put the PBGC at risk and
could result in default that would have an impact upon premium dollars and premium payers.
30. Under § 4067 of ERISA, the PBGC is authorized to arrange for equitable and appropri-
ate deferred payment terms.
31. During the legislative process, the Senate Finance Committee cautioned that deferred
terms should not be used to "defeat the purpose for imposing this contingent liability - deter-
rence of unrealistic promises and of abuse of the insurance system." S. REP. No. 383, su ra note
11, at 89, reprintedin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 1157.
32. ERISA § 4062.
33. Id. § 4067.
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eliminating CELL134 would leave the imposition of employer liability as
it should be. Repeal of section 4023 would still leave the termination
insurance program with other potential weakneses. The easy access to
voluntary terminations by solvent employers can lead to unnecessary
benefit losses for plan participants and cause the PBGC administrative
expense to be passed on to other plan sponsors through premiums. It
was a concern over these consequences that led the CELI Panel and the
PBGC staff to consider alternative approaches to the plan termination
insurance process.35 These alternatives would, in varying degrees,
transform the termination insurance program from one based on vol-
untary terminations into one where the insurable event was keyed to
business hardship or to employer insolvency. If properly implemented,
an insolvency insurance program could substantially lower the poten-
tial guaranty and administrative costs of the present program, persuade
employers to make their commitments to defined benefit plans more
realistically sustainable and ultimately assure greater benefits to em-
ployee participants.
II. INSOLVENCY INSURANCE
Various approaches to insolvency insurance, which the staff of the
PBGC is presently considering, might better implement the purposes of
ERISA than the present provisions for termination insurance. This
section will: first, describe the two proposals made to Congress for pos-
sible implementation of an insolvency program; 36 second, outline a
third alternative that has been formulated since the CELI report was-
presented to Congress; 37 and finally, discuss the West German and
Swedish insolvency insurance programs, all of which suggest that insol-
vency insurance may be, to some extent, a practical alternative to the
present termination insurance program.
A. The CELI Panel Proposal- Alternative A.
Under the CELI Panel's 38 proposal, the PBGC would still provide
plan termination insurance for any plan termination now qualifying
under ERISA. Irrespective of the reasons for termination, the em-
ployer would not be immediately liable to the PBGC for the entire un-
34. Id. § 4023.
35. See generally CELI REPORT.
36. See id. 35-50.
37. Appendix I sets forth in tabular form the main features of the present statute and the
three alternative proposals described in notes 38-72 infra and accompanying text.
38. The members of the panel are listed in REPORT TO THE PBGC ADVISORY COMM. app. A,
reprinted in CELI REPORT app. II, at xiii.
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funded amount. Instead, the employer would be liable for equal
annual payments, approximating the contribution level, until the entire
unfunded obligation has been satisfied.3 9 This provision would elimi-
nate the possibility of a single immediate payment of the liability, thus
providing significant relief to all terminating sponsors.4 0
To deter the attractiveness of plan termination that automatic
deferral of payments would provide under the Panel proposal4' and, in
part, out of a conviction that "those employers who were financially
capable of living up to their commitments should be required to do
so, 142 the CELl Panel proposed that the thirty percent net worth limita-
tion on an ongoing employer's liability be eliminated and that the
thirty percent net worth limitation might only become applicable to an
employer who ceases doing business.43 Thus, if an ongoing business
terminated its plan, there would be no limitation on liability.' If a
plan were terminated in conjunction with a liquidation of the corpora-
tion, there might be a thirty percent net worth limitation on liability.45
In addition to requiring employers to fund their contractually-incurred
obligations after termination, this proposal would reduce the number
39. CELl REPORT 35, 37, app. II, at iii-iv.
40. ERISA § 4067 provides the PBGC with the power to arrange for deferred payment of
liabilities as the PBGC "deems equitable and appropriate," but it is clear from the legislative
history that such power was not to be exercised unless it could be justified by business hardship.
See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
41. CELl REPORT 37-38.
42. Id. 38.
Many businesses that do not have large net worth could still be capable of discharging
significant financial obligations over time. For example, service industries can conceiva-
bly generate sufficient cash flow to pay for their pension liabilities. The use of net worth
limitations to reduce the pension obligations of a healthy employer was considered an
unfair burden to place on responsible employers through the premium system.
Id. 38-39.
43. See id. 36, 37-39.
44. Id. app. II, at x-xi. "The main problem that CELI was to solve-buffering the single sum
employer payment on plan termination--could be solved better by not creating the problem: sim-
ply have the employer continue to fund until the job is done." Unpublished comments of H.
Givens presented at the DUKE LAW JOURNAL'S symposium entitled "Pension and Profitsharing
Plans: Further Considerations," Washington, D.C. (Oct. 27, 1978) (on file at DUKE LAW JOUR-
NAL).
45. The panel considered the net worth limitation unnecessary under its proposal. Because
the limitation is a means of avoiding what might be a difficult single sum liability to pay at the
time of plan termination, the provision for amortization of the liability would eliminate that im-
pact. REPORT TO PBGC ADVISORY COMM. app. B, reprinted in CELI REPORT app. II, at xviii.
However, the panel conceded that a continuance of the 30% net worth limitation "is a logical
consequence of replacing the requirement of a single sum payment with a continued annual fund-
ing, since. . .[the continuation of the limitation on liability] provides an equivalent reassurance
to credit sources," who might otherwise be unwilling to lend to a corporation with a significant
contingent liability for termination. REPORT TO PBGC ADVISORY COMM. app. C, reprinted in
CELI REPORT app. II, at xix.
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of net worth determinations and would correspondingly reduce a com-
plex and costly administrative workload element of the present basic
benefits program at the time of voluntary plan termination.4 6
To provide additional relief for financially troubled sponsors who
have terminated their plans, businesses that have suffered three consec-
utive years of operating losses exceeding one-half of the cumulated
earnings of the three years preceding the loss years would receive a
waiver of $10,000 of the next annual payment under the CELI Panel's
proposal.4 7 In addition, the proposal would waive up to $1 million per
annual payment during any year in which the employer is undergoing
a court-supervised reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. 8
B. The PBGC Staff Proposal- Alternative B.
The staff proposal (Alternative B) would essentially tie PBGC ter-
mination insurance to employer insolvency or bankruptcy. This would
be accomplished by making the accumulated liabilities of the pension
plan a legal liability of the employer.4 9 As such, plan termination
could occur only in the context of bankruptcy, business termination or
when plan liabilities were fully liquidated or discharged as, for exam-
ple, through lump sum distributions or annuity purchases for plan ben-
efits. Under this concept, at a minimum, continuing employers would
be permitted to eliminate future accruals, but would be required to
continue their plans and to credit future service for vesting purposes.50
As is now required in the case of a frozen plan 5 ' funding would be
required to cover such future service for vesting purposes.
If an employer terminated its business and underwent liquidation,
the pension plan would be treated like any other creditor and share in
the liquidated assets. If the plan's share of the assets could not provide
guaranteed benefits, the PBGC would make up the difference with pre-
mium monies.52 If an employer was undergoing reorganization or a
rearrangement of debt under new Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act,5 3
settlement of the plan's claim would be a component of such reorgani-
46. CELI REPORT 36.
47. Id. 36, 40.
48. Id. 36, 39. This proposal reflects the belief that the bankruptcy courts are an appropriate
arena in which to recognize business hardship. "The $1 million ceiling on waivers would provide
full coverage for over 99% of the sponsors of covered plans but still protect the insurance program
from the possibility of a single destructive claim." Id. 39.
49. See id. 42. This approach raised questions as to how it might affect the treatment of
pension liabilities on the balance sheet.
50. See id. 44.
51. Id.
52. Id. 47.
53. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
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zation.5 4 The pension plan's claim on behalf of participants would be
filed along with those of the employer's other creditors by an independ-
ent trustee 5 appointed to protect the plan's claim during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
If the court-approved plan of business reorganization resulted in
satisfaction of the plan's claim in an amount sufficient to pay benefits
on a level that would be guaranteed by the PBGC but less than that
promised by the plan, the plan would be restructured to reflect the
lower benefit level as provided by the reorganization plan. 6 The em-
ployer would be required to meet the funding standards for the plan at
the new benefit levels and would retain responsibility for its adminis-
tration. The PBGC would become involved only if the business subse-
quently terminated at a time when plan assets were not sufficient to pay
guaranteed benefits.
If the confirmed plan of reorganization reduced the employer's ob-
ligation to the plan to an extent that required the restructuring of bene-
fit levels below guaranteed benefits, then an insurable event would
occur.5 7 The PBGC would: first, become permanent trustee of the plan;
second, assume the obligation to pay guaranteed benefits; and finally,
take over the plan's assets, including the plan's reduced claim against
the employer as determined under the plan of reorganization and as
confirmed by the court. The employer's liability would be limited to
this court-determined amount and PBGC premium revenue would
fund the difference necessary to pay guaranteed benefits.5 8 To the ex-
tent that the proposed plan of reorganization would thus require termi-
nation insurance, the PBGC would expect to play a role in the
bankruptcy process to ensure that the proposed bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion plan was fair to the PBGC.59
In both situations (bankruptcy and business termination) in which
PBGC premium dollars would be involved, there would be no direct
assessment of employer liability by the PBGC. Rather, the employer's
obligation would be transformed into a direct liability to its pension
plan. Any relief from an employer's liability to the plan would occur in
the context of bankruptcy proceedings.
Alternative B would eliminate the thirty percent net worth limita-
tion on liability for insufficient funding and make an ongoing sponsor
54. See CELl REPORT 45.
55. The trustee would probably be the PBGC as an interim trustee under ERISA § 4041(g).
56. See CELI REPORT 44-45.
57. Id. 47.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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liable to the plan for unfunded benefits, as opposed to liability to the
PBGC for insufficient funding of guaranteed benefits as now provided
for by ERISA.60 This liability under Alternative B would be tempered
by the fact that the pension plan would be on par with other general
creditors in bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization proceedings for
its share of the assets or place in the priority of debts owed. Only if the
respective bankruptcy proceeding failed to provide assets sufficient to
fund guaranteed benefits, would the PBGC have to step in to make up
the difference.
61
C. The Evolution of Insolvency Insurance: Alternative C.
After submitting to Congress the CELI report, which contained
both Alternatives A and B, the CELI Panel and the PBGC staff met
and formulated another possible substitute for termination and contin-
gent liability insurance-Alternative C. This approach responds to a
key criticism of Alternative B-the prevention of any access to volun-
tary termination by an ongoing sponsor.62
As its central feature, Alternative C preserves from Alternatives A
and B a separation of the concepts of voluntary termination and of an
insurable event. Although the two might occur simultaneously, they
are treated as distinct. Voluntary termination under Alternative C
would have different consequences than those that occur when a plan
terminates under the present Act. When a plan terminates under the
current provisions of Title IV, the employer is relieved of all future
funding obligations, even though the employer continues as an ongoing
business. All future benefit accruals cease, and there is no future serv-
ice credit for'vesting purposes. If the terminated plan's assets are not
sufficient to pay the vested benefits that are guaranteed under Title IV,
the PBGC becomes trustee of the plan. To the extent that employer
liability does not make up the funding insufficiency, the PBGC uses
premium dollars to satisfy its benefit guarantees.
Under Alternative C, an employer would still be permitted to ter-
minate a plan voluntarily, but if the employer remains in business the
obligation of the employer to make contributions for unfunded vested
benefits would continue.6' A termination would occur when the plan
60. ERISA § 4062(b).
61. Alternative B would also significantly reduce the administrative expense presently in-
curred by the PBGC. For instance, the need for determining the net worth of an ongoing corpora-
tion would be eliminated.
62. "The main trouble with Alternative B is that there is now no way to terminate a plan-
which is a matter not just of form, but of substance: there is no way to stop the vesting clock until
vested benefits are fully funded." Comments of H. Givens, supra note 44, at 4.
63. The PBGC would not become trustee of the plan and there would be no need to call
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was amended to provide that future service will no longer be credited
for either benefit accrual or for vesting purposes. The sponsor would
thus be able to limit the benefits to be provided by the plan at their then
vested levels. However, several other results would also stem from ter-
mination.
First, the plan's schedule for funding vested benefits would be ac-
celerated to require funding within a reduced period, for instance ten
years.64 When the plan's assets were sufficient to liquidate its obliga-
tions, 65 a distribution could occur and the employer would have no fur-
ther obligation to the plan or to the PBGC. Until that time, the sponsor
would be required to continue funding the plan on the accelerated
schedule.66
Second, certain other technical adjustments would have to be
made. The plan would also have to be amended to provide for the
cessation of benefit accruals attributable to future salary increases for
employees whose interests are already vested. The sponsor would have
to eliminate supplemental and ancillary benefits, such as death and dis-
ability benefits, for which the conditions precedent to entitlement had
not yet been fulfilled.
Following a voluntary termination, employers ceasing business
operations would be expected to discharge their pension obligations as
they would those of any other creditor. If the obligations could be met
from the plan's or the employer's assets, the liquidating sponsor would
have no further liability. If the business was liquidating, the pension
plan claim would share in the liquidated assets of the business as a
general creditor. If the plan's claim could not be satisfied in an amount
sufficient to provide for guaranteed benefits, an insurable event would
occur. The PBGC would become trustee and provide the guaranteed
benefits.
Thus, under Alternative C, an insurable event occurs, with attend-
ant PBGC involvement, only when the sponsor is financially unable to
provide guaranteed benefits that participants are entitled to receive
upon premium dollars for benefit payments or administrative expense until the employer either
became insolvent or went out of business.
64. "The essence of Alternative C is to allow the vesting clock to stop if the sponsor wants it
badly enough to pay for it by a faster pace of funding." Comments of H. Givens, supra note 44, at
4.
65. The obligations could be liquidated through a purchase of annuities or through payment
of lump sums, if permitted by the plan.
66. Following voluntary termination, if a plan sponsor found itself unable to meet its funding
obligations under the alternative funding schedule, the sponsor could seek partial funding waiv-
ers. If the partial funding waivers proved to be inadequate relief, the distressed sponsor could
only resort to bankruptcy reorganization. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
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under the plan. Normally, this inability will occur in the bankruptcy
court in a reorganization or an insolvency proceeding. Direct PBGC
involvement would then be limited to situations in which the sponsor is
undergoing reorganization or liquidation and would not occur auto-
matically on voluntary termination.
D. The Comprarative Merits ofAternatives A, B and C.
The alternatives to CELI all possess a certain common theme,
namely, the deferral of some (or all) of the present consequences of
voluntary termination. In the case of Alternative A, employer liability
is deferred from the date of plan termination to a schedule of yearly
payments, and all other consequences of plan termination remain the
same.67 If, during the period of deferred payment, business hardship
(primarily in the form of bankruptcy proceedings) should occur, addi-
tional relief would become available. In the case of Alternative B, ben-
efit reductions or plan termination would be permitted only during
bankruptcy reorganization, and thus, access to termination would be
related to business hardship or plan sufficiency. Alternative C is an
intermediate approach that permits the elimination or reduction of cer-
tain plan benefits prior to business hardship, but limits PBGC involve-
ment to an insurable event that may occur at a later date.
Although Alternative A shifts the focus of the PBGC's financial
assistance away from plan termination to business hardship, as evi-
denced by bankruptcy or insolvency, the proposal raises two concerns.
First, readily available time payments for employer liability may in-
duce terminations by strong employers in plant shutdown and liquida-
tion situations, particularly where there is a substantial difference
between vested liabilities (as in a frozen plan) and guaranteed liabilities
(as in a terminated plan).68 Such induced terminations could bring
with them unnecessary benefit losses for plan participants. Second, the
Panel's approach would have little impact on the cost of PBGC's case
processing operations and of the ongoing administration of plan assets
and benefits.6 9
67. For instance, the present restriction to guaranteed benefits for participants and the provi-
sions for PBGC trusteeship and benefits administration would remain applicable.
68. In other words, by terminating under Alternative A, a sponsor could reduce its obliga-
tions under the plan from the promised level of benefits to the guaranteed level of benefits without
incurring any special penalty, since the sponsor's annual obligation to the plan would be approxi-
mately the same before and after the termination. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
69. The administrative burden that plan terminations have placed upon the PBGC is signifi-
cant. Between July 1, 1978 and September 30, 1978, the PBGC opened 1,002 plan termination
cases while closing 1,284 plan termination cases. At the end of that period, the PBGC was serving
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Alternative B builds upon the Panel's proposals. It attempts to re-
duce unnecessary benefit losses to participants and to delay the admin-
istrative involvement of the PBGC in situations in which the employer
is financially capable of meeting its minimal responsibilities to the
plan. Alternative B could be expected to have a significant impact on
both the private pension system and the termination insurance pro-
gram.70 However, Alternative B has been viewed to possess certain dis-
advantages. Probably the most significant is Alternative B's impact on
an employer's finances and accounting procedures. Making pension li-
abilities the equivalent of an employer's legal obligations might aggra-
vate the issue of whether such liabilities should be disclosed as "full
fledged" corporate liabilities on the balance sheet or be reflected in the
footnotes.7 '
There is some apprehension that requiring the inclusion of pension
liabilities on the balance sheet as a liability could create unforeseen
disruptions in the financial affairs of many companies by, among other
things, placing them in violation of existing indenture agreements and
loan covenants. Depending on the treatment of such liabilities on the
income statement, significant reductions in reported income might also
result. Beyond these concerns lies the broader question as to the im-
pact of such "new" balance sheet liabilities on the availability and cost
of capital. While lenders and securities analysts are already paying
more careful attention to currently footnoted pension liabilities, it is
unclear whether elevating such liabilities will affect their evaluation of
a business.
Other areas that raise concerns include, for example, the impact of
the alternative proposals on plan formation and benefit improvements,
especially for small employers and smaller plans. These alternatives
may not make defined benefit plans more attractive to small employers,
and thus may not bring defined benefit coverage to workers not cur-
rently covered under such private plans.72
as trustee for 266 terminated plans. PBGC Fourth Quarter Bulletin, reportedin [1975-1979 Trans-
fer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,267.
70. Fewer plan terminations would mean fewer claims against the insurance system and
lower administrative costs to the PBGC. This, in turn, would help to keep premium rates down.
71. The proper disclosure of pension liabilities under the current law is presently a major
issue within the private sector. Recent decisions on related issues and disclosure drafts issued by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board suggests that the accounting profession itself may con-
clude that pension liabilities should be reported as real corporate liabilities. This issue may very
well be decided without considering the potential effects of adopting alternatives A, B or C.
72. For example, the elimination of voluntary termination for the ongoing sponsor in Alter-
native B has provoked the following criticism:
Plans are terminated for many reasons, none of which, fortunately, has yet to requirejustification to the PBGC or other governmental agency. The day when such justifica-
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The main difference in the various formulations of employer lia-
bility under Alternatives A, B and C concerns the amount of freedom
given solvent employers in dealing with benefit problems. Alternative
C maintains the flexibility presently available to employers under ER-
ISA (for instance, the ability to eliminate non-vested benefits by termi-
nating under the current statute) but takes away the freedom to transfer
to a government agency the responsibility for administering plan bene-
fits and for assuming investment risks. Alternative C also attempts to
respond to the financial and accounting concerns raised by Alternative
B by defining the events that trigger "legal" liability in terms of busi-
ness termination, voluntary plan termination, filing for bankruptcy, or
some other critical event, rather than at the dates the benefits accrue.
E. The Feasibility of Insolvency Insurance: The Foreign Experience.
Insolvency insurance may be a practical alternative to the present
combination of plan termination insurance, imposition of employer lia-
bility and the originally proposed program of contingent employer lia-
bility insurance. Several foreign countries, notably West Germany and
Sweden, have insolvency insurance programs in effect at the present
time.73 The experience of these two countries, thus far, demonstrates
not only that insolvency insurance may be a feasible method of provid-
ing protection to plan participants, but also that such protection can be
maintained largely through the efforts of the private sector.
In both West Germany and Sweden, under enabling legislation,
private industry formulated and now administers their pension insur-
ance programs.74 The method of funding pension plans, the approach
tion will be required will be the day when no more plans are created and no more bene-
fits are liberalized. In a free market, economic resources are allocated to what is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be the most effective use; if an employer concludes that
the game is no longer worth the candle, he must be free to bring his plan to an end.
What you cannot get out of, you will never voluntarily enter into.
Comments of H. Givens, supra note 44, at 9.
On the other hand, all three alternatives eliminate the threat of immediate imposition of
employer liability upon termination. ERISA § 4062. In one survey, 38.3% of the terminating
employers responding reported that this potential liability had a "very large" effect on the decision
to terminate, 19.6% reported a "moderate" effect on the decision and 30.1% reported "little or no"
effect on the decision. A large percentage of the responding sponsors were small employers with
relatively small plans. SUBCOMM. ON SBA AND SBIC LEGISLATION AND GENERAL SMALL Busi-
NESS PROBLEMS OF THE HousE COMM. ON SMALL BusINESS, ERISA QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
(1977), reprinted in [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,194. To the ex-
tent the alternatives eliminate the "one-shot" liability, the attractiveness of pension plans may be
enhanced.
73. See ROper, Germany-New Legislation on Employee Beneflts, BENEFITS INT'L, Mar. 1975,
at 10, 11; Book Reserve Or Insurance Is Permitted For Financing Swedish Pension Benefits, EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Feb. 1979, at 44.
74. See Rdper, supra note 73, at 10; Swedish Pension Benefits, supra note 73, at 44.
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to plan termination and the method of providing termination insurance
for plan participants are quite different from the methods under ER-
ISA but may be worthy of consideration as alternatives to present prac-
tices in the United States.
Most employers in West Germany and Sweden are permitted to
finance their pension promises through the "book reserve" method of
funding.75 This method of funding involves annual transfers on a com-
pany's income statement and balance sheet to reflect amounts set aside
to cover past accrued and currently accruing benefits. These transfers
are tax deductible by the employer at the time they are made under
regulations specifying the method of calculating the transfers. 76 Al-
though the tax advantages accrue to the employer at the time the
reserves are created, actual payment of benefits to retirees is deferred
until the benefits become due.77
The book reserve method enables an employer to retain the mon-
eys necessary to fund its pension obligations and to use them to finance
its own growth and development. Book reserves were originally intro-
duced in West Germany as a means of easing the cash flow and capital
problems of private industry following the devastation of World War
I1.78 Similarly, Sweden permits book reserve funding, under more
stringent requirements than West Germany,79 as a catalyst for the for-
mation of private pension plans and as a retained source of capital for
private industry development.80
Book reserve funding consists of an adjustment on the books of an
employer, and the integrity of any particular book funded plan may
ultimately depend upon the business fortunes of the employer. How-
ever, it does comprise prefunding of the plan to the extent that the em-
ployer's assets are earmarked for satisfaction of pension plan
obligations. The difference between book reserve funding and the pres-
ent system of funding used in the United States is that under book re-
serve funding the pension plan assets are invested in the employer's
own business, rather than diversified by investment in a variety of other
businesses. Obviously, there are hazards in the lack of diversification
75. Not all employers in countries that permit book reserving have unrestricted access to such
methods of funding. For instance, in Sweden an employer must undergo an initial credit check
and subsequent reviews every five years in order to finance its plan through book reserves and be
eligible for insolvency insurance. See Swedish Pension Benefts, supra note 73, at 44-45.
76. See Irons, Book Reserving in Germany-The Use of Insurance, BENEFITS INT'L, Apr.
1977, at 6, 7.
77. Id See also, Fflrer & Rossler, Profile on Germany, BENEFITS INT'L, Nov. 1976, at 7,11.
78. Ftirer & Rossler, supra note 77, at 11.
79. See note 75 supra.
80. See Swedish Pension Benefts, supra note 73, at 46.
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of such investment risk."1
To protect employees against exposure to loss of benefits under a
book reserve sytem, the German and Swedish systems provide insol-
vency insurance for employees. Unlike the present system of plan ter-
mination insurance under ERISA, these continental insolvency
insurance systems are administered by nongovernmental insurance
companies. A pool of private insurers offers single premium annuities
for entitled employees whose employers become insolvent. All em-
ployers maintaining plans in those countries and who use the book re-
serve system pay premiums that are available to purchase the annuities
for employees whose insolvent employers are unable to continue their
plans.8 2
Concomitant with allowing book reserve funding and providing
private insolvency insurance under the Swedish and West German
pension plan systems, employers are expected to continue their private
pension plans once instituted. Contrary to the freedom under Title IV
that American employers now have to terminate or cease future benefit
accruals under plans that they sponsor, 3 the foreign employers must
continue accruals under their plans until they become insolvent and go
out of business.
There are differences between the German and Swedish programs.
For example, in Germany, all plans using the book reserve method are
obligated to pay premiums for insolvency insurance and their employ-
ees become automatically covered by annuities furnished by a consor-
tium of private insurers if their employer becomes insolvent.84 On the
other hand, in Sweden, an employer may use the book reserve method
if the private insurance pool decides, on a risk assessment basis, to
make insolvency insurance available to that employer.
For purposes of exploring the feasibility and desirability of an in-
solvency approach to plan termination insurance in this country, it is
81. It has been noted that
[i]f booking were the mandatory practice here, it would clearly lead to a less effective use
of funds overall, since not every plan sponsor has equal economic use for them. If book
reserving were optional here, it could in some instances reduce the cost of acquiring
capital for sound business expansion, but at the risk of making too easy in other circum-
stances the use of funds in ventures that are either less rewarding or less sure. This
"Balkanization" of the sources of investment capital can only impair markedly the effi-
ciency of the present deep capital markets of the United States, which are unique in the
world, with no prospect of anything but overall impairment of the investment return on
pension funds, and on all other funds as well.
Comments of H. Givens, supra note 44, at 7-8.
82. See Roper, supra note 73, at 11; Swedish Pension Ben its, supra note 73, at 44.
83. See ERISA § 4041. Of course, collective bargaining agreements may restrict this free-
dom.
84. See Flrer & Rdssler, supra note 77, at 11.
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only pertinent to note that some form of book reserve funding by em-
ployers might be appropriate if termination insurance under ERISA
was primarily available only in insolvency situations. With termina-
tion insurance accessibility so restricted, some greater flexibility in re-
tention of pension assets for internal use and development than that
now permitted under ERISA 5 might compensate employers, to some
extent, for surrender of their present easy access to termination. A par-
tial book reserve system or increased allowable investment in employer
securities or assets might be acceptable in such a context. Controls,
other than those currently imposed by funding and fiduciary standards
under the present provisions of ERISA, could be devised for such re-
laxation of the current restrictions on self-investment of plan funding.
Such an alteration in present funding requirements would not di-
vert pension assets from the private investment sector. To the extent
that book reserve funding would be available, a percentage of a plan's
assets would not be available for diversified placement in the entire
spectrum of investment opportunities, but the assets would remain in
the private sector as additional retained capital for the particular em-
ployer sponsoring the plan. This approach might serve as an incentive
for responsible employers to institute plans or improve benefits in ex-
isting plans.
III. THE FUTURE OF PLAN TERMINATION INSURANCE
The possible legislative modifications of Title IV presently under
study by the PBGC may be vital to the continuance of the private pen-
sion system. Plan termination insurance for employees, in one form or
another, is here to stay.86 The private pension system could become
part of an overall governmental program akin to social security, or it
could remain within the discipline and control of the private pension
community. The interests of employees, employers and the entire busi-
ness community suggest that a common effort is essential to the preser-
vation of the private system.
The PBGC would welcome participation, or even preemption, by
private carriers of the responsibility for the termination insurance pro-
gram. Private insurer participation in an insolvency insurance program
could return the defined pension plan termination insurance program,
in large part, to the private sector where the program belongs. With the
sanctions imposed by Titles I and II of the Act, most ongoing plans
85. See ERISA § 407.
86. Although Congress is considering several legislative proposals concerning ERISA, none
of them would alter the concept of plan termination insurance under Title IV.
[Vol. 1979:593
INSOL VENCY INSURA4NCE
should, in the long run, maintain the financial integrity necessary to
provide their promised pension benefits and thus make the insurance
risk acceptable to private underwriters. It is conceivable that the
PBGC, which is now a self-financed government corporation, could
eventually be transformed into a nonprofit membership corporation
8 7
and become a major insuring or coinsuring vehicle for furnishing such
coverage in conjunction with other private insurers.
In order for the insolvency insurance approach to plan termination
insurance to work, employers must regard their pension commitments
as part of their total wage package and treat them as they would all
other ongoing business obligations. The pension commitments should
be met so long as the employer can do so financially. Employees must
be prepared to accept a scaling-down of their defined benefit expecta-
tions to lower levels as a trade-off for continued employment when
their jobs are jeopardized by their employer's financial difficulties. The
business community in general must recognize the potential loss of pri-
vate investment capital that would result from the replacement of the
private pension system with a government program confined to Treas-
ury investments and financed through tax revenues.
While the insolvency approach and its accompanying commitment
to the plan by ongoing employers may initially seem radical and may
possibly make defined benefit plans less attractive to smaller employ-
ers, there may be compensating advantages to the greater body of em-
ployers in such a proposal. By enforcing pension obligations of
ongoing employers, either on a full or curtailed basis, the program
would encourage greater discipline on the part of employers in making
and funding pension promises. Employers would have to appraise re-
alistically their current and prospective business posture when they in-
stitute or improve defined benefit plans. While this may result in some
temporary abatement in the rate of new plan formations and of benefit
improvements in existing plans, the integrity and reliability of all plans
will be strengthened, and in the case of ongoing employers, the number
of plan terminations should decrease substantially. The risk of abuse
of the program through unnecessary or unwarranted terminations
should diminish markedly. Fewer terminations will inevitably reduce
claims against the termination insurance program, and the decreased
case load will lower administrative costs for the program. This should
result in lower insurance premiums for responsible employers and a
strengthened private defined pension benefit system.
87. A similar corporation is the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC) that
insures customers of financially troubled brokerage houses. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-Il (1976).
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For employees, such reenforced commitment of employers to their
plans enhances the prospect of continuing plans at their present or per-
haps curtailed levels instead of complete termination and possible loss
of all vested benefits not guaranteed by the PBGC. The increased like-
lihood of continued employment by ongoing employers should more
than counterbalance the possible dimunition in benefit expectations for
employees of such employers.8" If the plan is insufficient and must ulti-
mately be taken over by the PBGC, the employee would still be assured
of receiving guaranteed benefits and might receive more under a cur-
tailed, frozen or "voluntarily terminated" plan under Alternative C
than from a terminated plan under the present program.
Apart from its role as a sponsor of pension plans, the business
world has another interest in the preservation of a privately managed
pension system in the United States. Both trusteed and insurance-
funded plans control assets in the ever mounting hundreds of billions
of dollars and have provided an essential source of investment capital
for industry.8 9 A change in the present program that would serve to
strengthen the integrity of the private pension system and to continue
the presence of that vast pool of investment dollars in the private sector
deserves serious consideration by the business community. A switch to
a government-administered retirement system would remove most, if
not all, of those dollars from the private investment arena and relegate
them to the coffers of the United States Treasury in one form or an-
other.90 If the performance of government-controlled retirement sys-
tems to date is any guide, there have been very few pre-funded assets in
such plans that would be available for any form of investment prior to
their required utilization for the payment of benefits. Finally, govern-
mental administration and control of all retirement programs would
inevitably increase regulatory intrusion into the business operations of
the private sector.
88. In the case of some marginal employers, business shutdowns may occur if the employer
must continue contributions and cannot scale down or discontinue pension accruals to lower con-
tribution costs.
89. See Assets of( & I 1,000 Exceed$353 Billion, Pensions & Investments, Jan. 1, 1979, at 1,
col. 1.
90. Under the existing statute, which would not be altered in this regard by the proposed
modifications, premiums payable under the program must be deposited in revolving funds in the
Treasury Department and may not be invested in anything but Treasury floated or Treasury guar-
anteed issues. ERISA § 4005(b)(3). It can be anticipated that under an overall government retire-
ment program such a policy would inevitably be applied to all funds necessary to sustain the
system.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The PBGC has from its inception considered one of its most im-
portant functions to be the administration of Title IV in a manner that
would best serve to strengthen the private pension system. The Corpo-
ration has maintained an "open-door policy" of consulting with repre-
sentatives of the private sector concerning major policy questions and
specific case problems. At a time when the workability and desirability
of a domestic private pension system is being seriously questioned, the
PBGC and the private pension community should intensify the ex-
change of ideas and ultimately coalesce them into proposals to the
Congress that will best serve "to encourage the continuation and main-
tenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their par-
ticipants."'" As the single most important source of capital in the
investment market, a strong private pension system can effectively cre-
ate jobs and fight inflation. It is essential to the interests of both em-
ployers and employees that ERISA work as intended by Congress. 2
91. ERISA § 4002(a).
92. The foregoing observations are not intended to represent an official position of the
PBGC. They have been expounded primarily for the purpose of eliciting from the private pension
community its views, positive or negative, and, more importantly, its suggestions for other possible
legislative modifications or perhaps its preference for maintenance of the status quo of the present
program.
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